Being a philosopher of education
To understand education necessitates understanding a complex interaction of practices, theories, ethics and politics. To be an educator is to do something: to undertake a practical activity with a view to making a difference. The kinds of differences that educators make can never be epistemologically, ethically or politically neutral. So such practical activities are complex, and always ethical and political. I use the term 'educators' rather than 'teachers' because the former has a broader signification. It includes school teachers. It also includes tutors in adult and community education, pre-school staff, policy makers, administrators and university lecturers.
It is possible to be an educator without paying attention to explicit theories of education, or to the reasons behind policy changes which affect practice. Indeed some educators prefer to see education as a severely practical activity, without need of complex theorisation. However when educators take this view they severely curtail their understanding of their own practices and so their capacity for reflection and examination of what they are doing. They miss the opportunity to engage with research and explicit theory in order to improve what they do. They also miss the opportunity of making their own implicit theories explicit in order to bring them into articulation with a diversity of perspectives based on practice, research and scholarship.
Those whose roles mean they spend a considerable proportion of their time In short, educators live educational lives. They have responsibility for what they are doing, regardless of whether they are among those who are primarily engaged in practice or among those who are primarily engaged in theorising. This means that they cannot escape the significance of ethical and political reflexivity.
The focus in this paper is on one subset of educators for whom there is a further complexity: philosophers of education. Philosophy itself may be understood to be a responsible practice as well as a theoretical pursuit. Thus to be a philosopher can be understood as living a philosophical life, just as being an educator is to live an educational life. Both kinds of lives are self-constructed. There can be no universal, timeless meaning for either of the phrases, 'living a philosophical life' and 'living an educational life'. Their meanings are contingent on the historical, geographical, personal, social and cultural circumstances in which that life is being lived. To paraphrase Marx, philosophers of education live philosophical, educational lives, but not in circumstances of their own making.
In this paper I consider how far and in what ways it is possible to live a philosophical, educational life, nowadays. I will not be arguing that philosophers of education ought
to 'practice what we preach' (though I think we should) because to argue that ethical position is well beyond the scope of this paper. philosopher also has to try to persuade others to value wisdom (Apology 29d).
Moreover, philosophy is not just a matter of theorising and conversing with individuals about virtue, but also of the public good more generally, the good of the city (36d). He was clear that living the philosophical life included the doing of philosophy through talk: a commitment to debate and to the deep concern for the good of the polity and the individuals within it. He was keen to point out that he was willing to debate with any and everybody, not just with those willing to pay (33a Aristotle can be said to have begun this process of footnoting to Plato using general ideas rather than specific ones. His idea of wonder seems to be far more related to puzzlement, and indeed to facts yet to be discovered rather than to mathematical or logical ideas. This leaves Aristotle as far from Socrates' concern with individual and collective virtue to be continually sought in dialogue with anyone willing to engage in it as he is from Plato, his own teacher.
Different answers to the question, 'What is philosophy?' seem to reflect a number of continuing tensions within philosophy and philosophising. These are the kinds of tensions that can already be seen in Plato as he moves away from Socrates, but continues to be influenced by him. They can then be seen again in Aristotle as he in turn moves away from Plato but continues to be influenced by him. The term 'tensions' is used because they are precisely that: tensions. That is, they exist because there is more than one force. A tension which is particularly significant for educators is related to the extent to which philosophy is taken to be something which springs from and engages with the everyday world. Philosophers differ in how far they take what they do to be something which is intended to make a difference to that world and how far they take it to be a contemplation of it. Plainly, educational philosophers are less likely to position themselves close to the contemplation end of this tension. I am of the view that research and scholarship carried out as 'educational' is intended to make a difference. Of course it may be that it is carried out about education without being 'educational' (Griffiths, 1998) . Research and scholarship about education may be carried out without any intention of making a practical difference, but be done, perhaps, out of curiosity, or from the joy of understanding the logic of some area of it.
Simone Weil is an example of a philosopher who felt the force of both engagement and contemplation, while mostly working with a resolution in terms of the former.
She says:
The proper method of philosophy consists in clearly conceiving the insoluble problems in all their insolubility and then in simply contemplating them, fixedly and tirelessly, year after year, without any hope, patiently waiting.
(Quoted in Cameron 2003, p.250) This remark is significant because Weil put her own health and security at risk in order to engage politically in education as a philosopher/teacher, and again later as a manual worker. Philosophising was an integral part of her activism (Weil, 2005) .
Another significant tension is between philosophy as process and as product. I use the terms, 'process' and 'product' to emphasise the link with education and educational theory and practices, where these terms are often used to distinguish different understandings of the curriculum. They are not the terms popular in current mainstream philosophical writing where it is more usual to talk of 'methods' and 'systems'. Some descriptions emphasise product: the kinds of understanding that philosophy engenders and the systems it has developed in order to do so. Other descriptions of philosophy emphasise process: that to learn and understand philosophy necessarily implies doing it, and further, that the method of doing of it just is the philosophy.
The resolution towards product or process is related to the resolution of the tension between engagement and contemplation. If the resolution is towards process (method), tensions arise about what might count as a dialogue and a rational argument. Differences occur about the role of imagery in argument, as pointed out by Le Doeuff (1989) . The nature of rationality itself is also in question. Lloyd (1984 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994) . According to this resolution, great philosophers are those who create fertile, explanatory concepts.
Heidegger, Arendt and Jaspers are three philosophers whose philosophies were formed in relation to each other and they provide an interesting example of different ways of resolving these tensions. Heidegger developed systems of thought while also teaching and taking the post of rector of his university. The degree to which his philosophy is embedded in its Nazi context is a continuing subject of debate, but he never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics. Jaspers, on the other hand, thought it more important to teach and to engage politically, rather than to create a philosophical system. Arendt's resolution in The Human Condition (Arendt, 1958 ) was to create a system which was embedded in the world, but to call it 'political theory' rather than philosophy. Philosophy proper, she thought was more ' (1998; Barr and Griffiths, 2007; Leicester, Twelvetrees and Bowbrick, 2007) .
Examples of living a philosophical, educational life
The philosophical, educational life in education will include writing for and/or debating with other philosophers and educators, in particular, educational philosophers. But it will also include activities intended to make a difference. These may include specifically pedagogical activities, especially teaching students on accredited courses. And they may include attempts to influence policy and/or public opinion about education in various ways. In this section I look at some examples from Europe and North America, to see how understandings of philosophy of education have been expressed in educational, philosophical lives in the not too distant past, both through teaching and through attempts to influence educational policy.
3a. Pedagogy
There were rebelling in part against the felt inadequacies of their own undergraduate educations.... instead of 'real' philosophical questioning, these philosophers felt that they had been offered a kind of apologetics for religious and political conservatism. (Campbell, 2002, p.54) He goes on to explain that at the same time that the APA was being founded, research universities were being set up. These research universities saw their primary teaching focus to be graduates, but also considered that time spent teaching was time away from high quality scientific inquiry, including in philosophy. 
3b. Policy
For policy, as for pedagogy, it is relatively easy to find published material on how philosophy should influence policy. But there is little on how that is done and even less on how that fits with the philosophical views behind it. So in what follows, again I turn to personal accounts, this time drawing more on interviews than on biography.
Recent research on how social science research, including theoretical research, can influence policy indicates that it does so in a way which leaves space for philosophy (Nutley, Walter and Davies, 2007) . Most often, policies emerge piecemeal and by accretion, becoming shaped by dialogue with many actors and through a process of implementation (Nutley, 2009) 5 .
Naturally, the opportunities for dialogue that present themselves vary with country, as well as with the philosophical commitments of individual philosophers of education.
In Malta, Kenneth Wain described how he experienced being part of a high profile We produced a report. The difficulty with reports is they get published, you get a bit of notice in the newspapers, and then they sit on shelves. And so I don't think just producing books is really going to influence anybody very much. We produced a synopsis with our recommendations and made sure that It is arguable that these three philosophers have a view of influence which can be seen to be congruent with their philosophical positions. Wain particularly emphasises critique and that both education and philosophy are embedded in community, as he does in his philosophical writing. Levering's work shows him to favour phenomenological and conceptual methods in order to come to some objective understandings. This fits well with his willingness not only to provide brief statements for the media but also to engage in argument about them. Pring discusses the issue directly:
Raising these questions about the aims of education, the broader aims and not having those aims impoverished by a very narrow view of academic learning, is one of our main messages. I think another one is in that wider vision of learning, coming from those wider aims, we emphasise the importance of practical intelligence and so on. ... I think it's a lot to do with philosophy in so far as we do put forward an argument. (Pring, conversational interview, November 2010)
Nowadays.
This paper has presented some differing views about what it is to live an educational, philosophical life as a philosopher and as a philosopher of education. These accounts are all, necessarily, describing the past, sometimes the recent past. In the rest of the paper I consider whether such approaches are still relevant, given how fast the world of Higher Education is changing. This is not just a local question. In our globalised world of fast communication, educational policy travels nationally, regionally in Europe, and globally.
Global educational policy has been tending towards centralised policy initiatives, often designed to put learning and any associated teaching directly in the service of the government, very often in relation to the national economy. Within the European Union policies avoid using the term 'education' so perhaps notice has been taken that it has not often been conceptualised so narrowly (Wain, 2007, p.46) . The EU's re-conceptualisation has been powerful (Boulton and Lucas, 2008; Delauré, 2010; Geschwind and Larsson, 2008; Maasen, 2000) . As Maasen argues for Higher Education Institutions (HEIs):
The traditional underlying idea of the European HEI as a public, Universities increasingly see themselves as brand labels operating in a market (e.g.
Morgan, 2011)
This service industry is expected to operate in relation to both students and research. The levers that governments operate to implement the policies are a mixture of government (through funding regimes) and governance (through a range of mechanisms, especially league tables). Quite often a kind of Faustian pact is made, in which HE is given a steer from government but itself determines the details of benchmarks and measures, for fear of anything worse being imposed. These pacts operate in relation both to teaching and to research, and also tend to drive a wedge between these two activities.
Students These exercises have had a huge influence on how individuals and institutions carry out and fund research.
Government has a limited but significant ability to force change. An example is provided by the 2010 UK Browne Report on funding in Higher Education. It has generated serious questions about the future of the arts and humanities in British universities (Collini, 2010) .
Governance has proved even more effective. Standardised quality criteria for teaching and research are used to construct league tables and universities are keen to be seen near the top of national and international league tables. That said, not surprisingly, since there is a plethora of available tables on the web, each institution strives to spin such information to its own advantage.
Does a kind of hemlock beckon?
I now return to the question which was posed at the start of the paper: How far and in what ways it is possible to live a philosophical, educational life, nowadays? It may be that it is possible only for some conceptions of education and only for some resolutions to the tensions of philosophy. Both teaching and research are expected to serve the needs of the government and economy, as perceived by government and employers. The pedagogy that is recommended is one that focuses on clear, measurable objectives and outcomes, which include transferable 'graduate skills' and which are specified in advance. Students are asked to evaluate a course in terms of whether these specifications have been met.
Outcomes such as 'thinking more deeply', or which are 'to be determined in discussion with the class' are not acceptable. Equally, research outcomes are expected to be measurable. In the UK, they are assessed in relation to their influence ('impact') other than through scholarship and teaching. They also contribute to the reputation of a university, improving its ability to attract fee-paying students. These approaches do not encourage My argument shows that opportunities to live a philosophical life depend on the context.
They also depend on the creativity of individual philosophers to see and seize their chances. Individuals may be able to continue to find ways of introducing their philosophical understanding into their professional practice. At the same time, being creative depends on there being time and space to think deeply and discuss arguments with peers, through conferences, seminars and Journal articles. Fortunately, even a 'modernised' university has some reason to support such activities owing to its wish to improve its market position through its academic reputation. However there is always a considerable danger that when somebody lives with, but tries to subvert, a hostile environment, that she deceives herself about who and what she becomes. It is possible to live an educational, philosophical life but it must mean expending considerable energy producing smoke screens behind which to do it, and a vigilant reflexivity about the shape that the life has become.
1 A Socrates of Athens gave this speech, but its content was not recorded directly at the time. In this paper I am discussing the Socrates reported by Plato rather than in the only other surviving account by Xenephon . 2 I am taking it that this is more a Platonic rather than Socratic view, since it comes from the Theaetetus, which is usually agreed to be one of the later dialogues. 3 Educational practice is full of tensions that need to be resolved in context and always provisionally. Berlak and Berlak (1981) remains an exemplary example of such an approach to understanding school teaching. 4 Though springing from life, as I understand it -see Arendt (1961) . 5 I say more about policy in Griffiths (2012) 
